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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s
by introducing endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New
Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We
subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a
scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s.
Monetary policy implements a disinflation by following an interest
feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function.
40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.8
percentage points above its steady state. Our model also broadly
reproduces cross country differences in unemployment by drawing on
cross country differences in the size of cost push shock and the associated
disinflation, the monetary policy reaction function and the wage setting
structure.Contents
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11 Introduction
The persistent increase in continental European unemployment since the 1970s is of-
ten blamed on labour markets having become more rigid. There is however growing
evidence that labour market institutions, while powerful at explaining cross country
di⁄erences in unemployment at a given point in time, are less so at explaining the
evolution of unemployment across time, or at least leave a lot to be explained. Find-
ings along these lines include the IMF (2003), Nickell (2002), Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000), Fitoussi et al. (2000) and Elmeskov (1998).
This paper examines the rise in European unemployment by introducing endoge-
nous growth into a New Keynesian model featuring unemployment. We subject the
economy to a 1 quarter non-serially correlated cost-push shock and let the central
bank disin￿ ate the economy - as happened in many industrialised economies at the
beginning of the 1980s. This temporary shock can cause a persistent and substan-
tial increase in unemployment, lasting over 10 to 20 years in an order of magnitude
of 1 percentage points or more. The model also sheds light on some cross-country
di⁄erences in the unemployment experience.
More precisely, we aim to shed light on the following set of stylised facts and
empirical ￿ndings:
￿ Unemployment has increased substantially in many large European economies
since the 1970s. Figure 1 displays quarterly unemployment rates from 1975 to
2000 for six selected European Economies and the United States. Note that
unemployment is very persistent: It increases relatively quickly, as for instance
during the recessions at the beginning of the 80s, but reverts only relatively
slowly, incompletely, or not at all. By contrast, unemployment in the United
States shows less persistence. It also does not show much of a trend.
￿ There has been a decline in the growth rate of labour productivity (measured as
output per hour worked) across OECD countries in the 1980s. This decline has
been substantially larger in Western European Economies than in the United
States. Average annual productivity growth in Western European economies
was 1.5% lower in the period from 1981 to 1990 than in the previous decade,
while it declined by merely 0.2% in the United States.1 Skoczylas and Tissot
(2005) estimate changes in trend productivity growth for OECD economies from
1960 to 2004. They locate declines between one and 3.9% between 1976 and
1985 in 9 Western European Economies but none in the United States.
￿ It is a consistent ￿nding that a decline in productivity growth increases un-
employment. Examples include Bassanini and Duval (2006), Pissarides and
1The number is based on cross country averages for 1971-1980 and 1981-1990 of the productivity
growth rates of Belgium, Denmark, Western Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Norway. These rates are based on the series on GDP at
constant prices and total hours worked from AMECO (2008).
2Vallanti (2005), Nickel (2002, 2005), Ball and Mo¢ tt (2001) and Fitoussi et al.
(2000). Three of these studies (Bassanini and Duval, Blanchard and Wolfers, Fi-
toussi et al.) explicitly model interactions between productivity growth declines
and labour market institutions. They ￿nd that macroeconomic shocks help
to explain the evolution of unemployment across time while cross country-
di⁄erences in institutions help to explain why in some countries unemployment
responds more strongly to macroeconomic shocks than in others.
￿ Based on a study of 17 OECD countries, Ball (1999) argues that those central
banks willing to aggressively lower real interest rates during the recessions of the
early 1980s reduced the subsequent increase in the NAIRU in their countries.
￿ There seems to be a negative medium run relationship between the change in
in￿ ation and the change in the NAIRU. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which
plots the change in the NAIRU against the change in CPI In￿ ation for 21 OECD
countries from 1980 to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000. The negative correlation
is not perfect but still obvious: Countries with a larger decrease in in￿ ation
su⁄ered on average a larger increase in their NAIRU.2 Ball (1996) was the ￿rst
to draw attention to this link and also investigated it more formally.
Our results resemble in some respects those of Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998,
2007) in that the model proposed here generates an increase in unemployment with-
out relying on changes in labour market rigidity, while the "level" of labour market
rigidity does matter.3 However, their approach di⁄ers from ours in that in their
model, unemployment increases via the interaction of an unemployment insurance
paying bene￿ts linked to past income and a permanent increase in "microeconomic
turbulence". "Microeconomic turbulence" is the probability that a worker looses his
human capital in case his job is exogenously destroyed. The increase in turbulence
creates a fraction of unemployed workers who enjoy high bene￿ts (because they used
to be high skilled) but are now low skilled and thus have a low earnings potential
on the labour market. Therefore they have little incentive to engage in (costly) job
search, which reduces their probability of regaining employment. By contrast, our
approach is a macroeconomic one in that the driving force pushing up unemployment
is an in￿ ationary shock and the response of the central bank to this shock.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a model which broadly
re￿ ects the mainstream consensus on the long and short run dynamics of unemploy-
ment as for instance developped by Jackman et al (1991). In this model, a temporary
cost push shock only has a short lived e⁄ect on unemployment and so has the mon-
etary policy response to the shock. We coin this model "Jackman, Layard, Nickell",
2The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook. The countries are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, U.S.A.
3See Sargent and Ljungqvist (1998) and (2007).
3or JLN economy. We then add the New Growth extension. Section 3 discusses the
calibration, which is informed by empirical evidence on some of the model parameters
and by the comparison of the second moments of a couple of model variables with
their empirical counterparts. This moment comparison can be found in an extended
version of this paper.4 Section 4 then discusses the response of the economy to a
one quarter cost push shock calibrated to induce a disin￿ ation of about 4 percentage
points and focuses on the induced evolution of unemployment across time. It also
looks at the tradeo⁄s policymakers face between stabilising in￿ ation and stabilising
unemployment. Section 5 adds a cross-country dimension to our analysis. First, we
vary the size of the cost push shock and record the resulting changes in in￿ ation and
the NAIRU over a 10 year horizon. We then compare the di⁄erences in the unem-
ployment response generated by a Bundesbank and a Federal Reserve Policy rule as
estimated by Clarida et al. (1998), and ￿nally we investigate the e⁄ects di⁄erences
in real wage rigidity between Europe and the United States. Section 6 concludes.
















4See Rannenberg (2009). This version is available online: http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/13610/
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In this section we will present a New Keynesian model with unemployment and en-
dogenous growth which contributes to explaining the above ￿ndings. To stress the
fact our results stem from the introduction of endogenous growth, we also present an
otherwise identical model without endogenous growth which we take as the starting
point of our analysis. This is a model to approximate the prevailing consensus on the
relationship between unemployment and the NAIRU. We will refer to this model as
the JLN economy. This consensus says that while unemployment both in the short
and in the long run is determined by aggregate demand, only the NAIRU is consis-
tent with stable in￿ ation. In￿ ation targeting central banks will push unemployment
towards this level. The NAIRU itself will be a⁄ected by any variable which directly
increases wages in spite of excess supply in the labour market, increases the pricing
power of ￿rms or reduces the e¢ ciency of the labour market to match jobs to workers5
Below we list the aggregate equations of the JLN economy. After that we introduce
endogenous growth. Almost all equations are the same in both models. A longer
version of this paper (Rannenberg (2009)) provides the microfoundations.
5See Nickell et al. (2002), pp. 2-3.
52.1 JLN Economy
Aggregate demand ADt is the sum of consumption Ct, investment It, the amount of
price adjustment costs
’
2(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1)2Yt, and expenditure on government employees
wtns:






Price adjustment costs are the source of nominal rigidities in this model which will
give rise to the Phillips curve discussed below. Government employees account for a
￿xed fraction ns of the workforce.6
The representative household consists of a continuum of members who might be
employed or unemployed but are all allocated the same level of consumption. The
household is in￿nitely lived and chooses its consumption expenditure, bond holdings
and investment expenditure in order to maximise the expected present value of its
lifetime utility. We assume a logarithmic instantaneous utility function and, following
Smets and Wouters (2002), external habit formation in consumption and adjustment
costs in investment. Investment adjustment costs mean that only a fraction of in-
vestment expenditure is transformed into additional capital Kt. They are convex and
vanish when the economy is growing at the steady state growth rate g.
The ￿rst order conditions imply that consumption is governed by
1=(Ct ￿ habt￿1) = ￿ (1 + it)Et
￿
1
(Ct+1 ￿ habt)(1 + ￿t+1)
￿
(2)
where it; ￿t, ￿ and habt￿1 denote the nominal interest rate, the rate of in￿ ation,
the individual discount factor and the level of habit respectively, the last of which is
determined by
habt￿1 = jCt￿1
Capital accumulation is given by








￿ (1 + g)
￿2!
(3)
6The reason for introducing both state employees and overhead workers n is to achieve a rea-
sonable calibration of steady state values. In the Romer (1986) endogenous growth model, the level
of employment a⁄ects the growth rate. This is due to the fact that the marginal product of cap-
ital is an increasing function of employment. The marginal product of capital governs the growth
rate by determining the willingness of households to save. To achieve a reasonable steady state
growth rate, we remove a fraction of the labour force from "productive" sector by assuming that
they perform necessary tasks without which the productive sector could not operate (managerial
work in case of overhead workers, policing etc. in case of the state employees). We assume that
government employees are paid the same wage as private sector employees and are funded by means
of lump sum taxes. Overhead workers will be interpreted as managers who split the pro￿ts of the
monopolistically competitive ￿rms.


















































t and qt denote the marginal utility of consumption, the real capital rental,
and the real value of another unit of capital, also referred to as Tobin￿ s q, respectively.
The second equation says that the value (or price) of another unit of capital is given
by the present value of the t+1 rental income it generates plus its t+1 value. The
last equation says that ￿rms invest until the value of the additional unit of capital
produced plus the present value of t+1 adjustment costs saved equals one.
Aggregate demand determines aggregate output:
ADt = Outputt
Total output is given by the sum of private sector output and the output of state
employees, where private sector output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Outputt = AKt




TFPt and et denote total factor productivity and the e⁄ort level of employees, re-
spectively.7 In the absence of endogenous growth, TFPt evolves exogenously. Firms
choose capital and labour to minimise their costs of producing a given level of output.







where Yt denotes private sector output.
Following Dantine and Kurman (2004), the members of the household supply one
unit of labour inelastically but have preferences over e⁄ort while they are at work.
One of the ￿rst order conditions of the household is thus an e⁄ort function which
determines the level of e⁄ort. Households are willing to make a higher e⁄ort if they
are compensated with a higher wage relative to the past real wage. In addition,
the e⁄ort level is determined by a couple of other variables as well. We assume
that for a given real wage e⁄ort also depends negatively on past productivity (as
7Firms ￿nd it optimal to choose a constant e⁄ort level .
7the ￿rm gets more productive, employees demand a higher wage) and the level of
unemployment income (for instance bene￿ts), which in turn depends on past real
wages and productivity as well.
Firms choose the real wage as they are aware of the relationship between workers
morale, e⁄ort and the real wage. An extensive survey of Bewley (1998) provides
strong support for this view of wage setting. An increase in any of the variables
listed before will induce ￿rms to increase their wage o⁄er. Accordingly, the real wage
does not clear the labour market but evolves according to the following wage setting
function:
logwt￿logwt￿1 = a+b￿(nt ￿ n)+clog
￿
wt￿1 (nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ ns)
Yt￿1
￿
; b > 0; c < 0: (9)
This is very close to a speci￿cation derived by Blanchard and Katz (1999) from
intuitively plausible relationships between average wages, the reservation wage and
productivity.8 The growth rate of the real wage wt is positively related to employment
and negatively to the labour share. The e⁄ect of the labour share stems from the
direct impact of productivity on e⁄ort and the indirect impact through bene￿ts. If
these are absent, we have c=0.
Empirical estimates of (9) (usually replacing nt with the unemployment rate) or
variants thereof repeatedly ￿nd c=0 (or even c>0) for the United states but c<0 for
European countries.9 The di⁄erence could be due to the direct e⁄ect of productivity
on e⁄ort being close to zero in the U.S. but positive in Europe because of a larger
in￿ uence of unions who establish the idea that the reference wage should be linked to
productivity, as is also argued by Blanchard and Katz (1999). Using individual data
on compensation matched with ￿rm level data on performance and inputs, Abowd et
al. ￿nd that the relationship between ￿rm level wages and performance measures like
value added and sales per employee is stronger in France than in the United States.
One could also imagine that bene￿ts are linked more closely to productivity in Europe
because policymakers are more likely to believe in concepts of relative poverty rather
than absolute poverty and therefore would aim to link bene￿ts to a country￿ s overall
income.10








A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(￿1TFPt)1￿￿ (10)
The evolution of in￿ ation ￿t is determined by the Phillips Curve. It is derived
from the maximisation problem of a monopolistically competitive ￿rm producing a
8Blanchard and Katz (1999) specify the wage as a function of productivity and the reservation
wage, which in turn is a convex combination of average wages and productivity, as in our model.
9See Blanchard and Katz (1999), p.73, Blanchard and Katz (1997), p.62, OECD(1997), p. 21
and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p.484-486.
10See Abowd et al. (2001), pp. 429-433.
8variety from a CES basket. It faces quadratic price adjustment costs in the change







(￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 ￿ ut)(1 + ￿t ￿ ut) +
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(￿t+1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ut)(1 + ￿t+1)
￿
= 0 (11)
where ut, ￿ and ’ denote a cost push shock, i.e. a shock increasing in￿ ation for a given
level of marginal costs, and the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties
of the output good the household is consuming, respectively. It can be easily shown
that up to ￿rst order, this equation is a hybrid Phillips Curve with coe¢ cients on




Finally, monetary policy is speci￿ed by
it = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿






with gpt denoting the percentage deviation of output from potential output. The later
is de￿ned as the output level at which in￿ ation is not accelerating in the absence of
cost push shocks, given the level of technology, the capital stock and past real wages.





the inverse of the mark-up ￿rms would charge in the absence of any nominal rigidities.
The unemployment rate associated with output at its potential is the NAIRU.
2.2 Introducing Endogenous Growth
We introduce endogenous growth following Romer (1986).11 We assume that invest-
ing ￿rms discover ways to produce more e¢ ciently and that knowledge is a public
good. Therefore total factor productivity TFPt is assumed to be proportional to the
aggregate capital stock. Hence we replace TFPt with Kt in the above equations. The
equations for output and marginal costs are modi￿ed as follows:












A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(￿1Kt)1￿￿ (14)
The capital stock now has a stronger e⁄ect on both marginal costs and output than
in the JLN economy. An increase in the capital stock by 1% for a given employment
11The exposition here follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 212-215.
9level (implying that output expands at the same rate) reduces marginal costs by 1%.
In the absence of endogenous growth the e⁄ect is only ￿ %, where ￿ would typically
be calibrated to match the capital share and would thus be substantially smaller
than one. This can be seen by substituting the capital rental out of equations (14)
and (10) and then substituting Yt
Kt using the respective production functions. For the
New Growth economy, the real wage - capital ratio is now the main driver of marginal
costs.
3 Simulation Setup and Calibration
We aim to create a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks in Western Europe
at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the 1980s. That means we would like
to create a situation where annual in￿ ation increases several percentage points above
its target level for some time and is then subsequently reduced. Therefore ut is set
equal to 0.03 for the ￿rst quarter and the model is simulated under perfect foresight.
To put it di⁄erently, for given values of marginal cost, past and expected in￿ ation,
in￿ ation in that quarter is increased by three percentage points. In the baseline
simulation, this will give rise to a disin￿ ation of a bit more than 4.6 percentage
points over 5 years, if we compare annual rates in the ￿rst and the sixth year. This
is at the lower end of disin￿ ations actually experienced during that period. For
instance, in Germany, annual in￿ ation was at 6.3% in 1981, which was then reduced
to -0.1% in 1986, which is a rather small disin￿ ation compared to the UK, France or
Italy where in￿ ation declined by 8.6, 10.8 and 13.7 percentage points over the same
period, respectively. Note that there is no endogenous persistence in the shock itself
beyond the ￿rst quarter, implying that any persistence in the path of the variables and
in particular unemployment beyond that point is endogenous. The models are solved
employing a second order approximation to the policy function using the approach
of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). We use the software Dynare to implement the
solution.12
The calibration of the non-monetary policy model parameters for the experiment
described above is presented in table 1. It was arrived at as follows. We distinguish
between four di⁄erent types of parameters. The ￿rst set is calibrated according to
standard values in the literature. This set contains the discount factor ￿, the private
output elasticity of capital ￿, the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods
￿, the depreciation rate ￿; and the price adjustment cost parameter ’. ’ is calibrated
as to generate marginal cost coe¢ cient in the linearised version of equation (12)which
would also be generated in a Calvo Phillips Curve with full backward indexing of
unchanged prices and a probability of no re-optimisation is 2/3.
The second set, consisting of ns, a, b and c, is based on empirical evidence. ns
12To be able to solve our two growth models, we normalise with respect to the capital stock and
total factor productivity (see Appendix).
10is calculated from data of the German statistical o¢ ce on the number of full time
equivalent employees in the public sector and on total hours worked in the economy
in 2006. b and c are calibrated to be consistent with an estimate of that function.
We estimate (9) on German data on hourly labour costs, unemployment (instead of
employment, as is done in the empirical literature) and the labour share in GDP
ranging from 1970 to 2000. We then calibrate the intercept a to achieve a steady
state unemployment rate of 4%.
The third set consists of the three "free" parameters A, ￿ and j the production
function shifter, the parameter indexing adjustment costs and the degree of habit
formation. They were calibrated to match second moments of a couple of important
variables in German data. The results are discussed in an extended version of this
paper.
Table 1: Baseline Calibration of non-policy Parameters
￿ ￿ j A ￿ ￿ ￿1 ’ a b c ￿ u1 n
0.33 0.99 0.4 0.38 6 0.025 0.452 30 -0.1123 0.08 -0.1 0.65 0.03 0.1793
ns i gTFP ￿u
0.18 0.0181 0.0079 0.003
The baseline calibration of the monetary policy reaction function is taken from
Clausen and Meier (2003), who estimate a Bundesbank policy rule over the period
from 1973 to 1998 for quarterly data. Clausen and Meier￿ s best performing model
yields the statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients on output, in￿ ation and the lagged in-
terest rate reported in table 2 which in fact correspond to the original coe¢ cients
proposed by Taylor (1993) to characterise the policy of the Federal Reserve. Their
estimate of the output gap coe¢ cient is of particular interest because the Bundes-
bank was often perceived as paying less attention to output than the Fed. This is
also borne out by other Taylor-rule estimates, one of which we discuss below. For
the purpose at hand, we consider using the least hawkish baseline coe¢ cients for the
policy rule in the literature of Bundesbank Taylor rule estimates. It will become clear
why this is the case when we discuss the simulation results.
Table 2: Baseline Calibration of the Policy Rule: Clausen and Meier
(2003)13
 ￿  Y ￿
1.5 0.52 0.75
However, we are also interested in comparing the e⁄ects of di⁄erent policies esti-
mated for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Therefore we would like to draw
on a study using the same methodology to estimate policy rules for di⁄erent coun-
tries, Clarida et al. (1998). Their rule is estimated using monthly data. A quarterly
data version of their speci￿cation would be
it = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
i +  ￿Et
￿









13See Clausen and Meier (2003), p. 22.
11Hence the central bank responds to a one year forecast of in￿ ation, the current
output gap and the lagged interest rate.14 They measure potential output using a
quadratic trend of a West German industrial production index and their data set
stretches from 1979 to 1993 and estimate the policy rule using the general method
of moments.15 The point estimates are replicated in table 3. Clearly, the small
coe¢ cient on the output gap corresponds more to the conventional wisdom on how
the Bundesbank was conducting policy.
Table 3: Forward looking interest rate Rule: Clarida et al. (1998)16
 ￿  Y ￿
1.31 0.25 0.91
4 Explaining the Evolution of Unemployment across
Time
We now discuss the response of the New Growth and the JLN economy to a cost push
shock. This section focusses on understanding the induced evolution of unemployment
and in￿ ation across time. We ￿rst examine the results under the baseline calibration,
while subsection 4.3 examines the e⁄ects of varying the ouput gap coe¢ cient  Y in
the interest feedback rule.
In all ￿gures, the initial value is the steady state value of the respective variable.
Furthermore, when we refer to ￿Baseline￿in ￿gures or in the text, we always mean
the New Growth economy in its baseline calibration. The abbreviation "NGE" used
in the ￿gures refers to "New Growth Economy".
4.1 Unemployment and the NAIRU in the New Growth and
JLN Economy
Figure 3 plots the response of actual unemployment for the JLN and the New Growth
economy to the one quarter cost push shock. In the JLN economy, unemployment
increases by about 3 percentage points on impact but starts recovering after reaching
a maximum of 10.4%. It then quickly recovers and in quarter 8 practically returns to
its steady state value and then slightly overshoots for some time. Employment would
be expected to decrease because the cost push shock will increase in￿ ation which
will ultimately lead to an increase in ex ante real interest rates via equation 13. As
consumers and investors are forward looking, this causes a contraction of aggregate
demand on impact. Figure 4 plots the in￿ ation rate, which peaks in quarter 1 at a
value of about 3.8% and then quickly declines back to zero.
14See Clarida et al. (1998), p. 1039 and 1042.
15See Clarida et al. (1999), p. 1040.
16See Clarida et al (1998), p. 1045.
























13Figure 5: New Growth Economy, Baseline












By contrast, in the New Growth economy, unemployment increases by more on
impact than in the JLN economy. Even more important, the increase is far more
persistent. After about 11 quarters (10 quarters after the end of the shock), when
employment is already overshooting in the JLN economy, only a bit more than half
of the on-impact loss in employment has vanished and employment is still about 3.2
percentage points below its steady state value. What is more, employment growth
then comes to a halt: quarterly increases are around 0.06 percentage points per
quarter or less. As can be seen in table 4, in the New Growth economy, after 10
years unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state value
and after 15 years the di⁄erence is still about 1.2 percentage points. Thus as often
observed in the Europe, unemployment increases quickly but falls only very slowly.
Furthermore, Figure 5 reveals that the persistent increase in actual unemployment is
matched by an increase in the NAIRU, as after six quarters, actual unemployment
falls below the NAIRU, which gradually increases during and after the recession. A
glance at Figure 4 shows that in￿ ation (after peaking in quarter 1 at a quarterly
rate of about 3.3 percentage point) indeed stops declining at about the same time
actual unemployment falls below the NAIRU, as we would expect from the de￿nition
of the NAIRU. Thus the disin￿ ation engineered by the central bank, while clearly
successful, has come at a cost beyond a temporary reduction in employment: The
unemployment level consistent with constant in￿ ation has increased.
14Table 4: Unemployment deviation from the Steady State in the New
Growth Economy, Baseline and  y = 5, percentage Points
Quarters 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Baseline 3.1 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.2 1 0.8
 Y = 5 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4
Associated with the increase in unemployment in the New Growth economy is a
persistent slowdown in labour productivity growth. This is in line with the evidence
cited above. After 10 quarters it falls short of its steady state value by about 0.21%
per quarter or 0.88% at an annualised rate, while 40 quarters after the shock it is still
about 0.13% lower than in the steady state, or 0.54% at an annualised rate. Average
annualised productivity growth over the ￿rst 10 years after the shock equals 2.46%.
Assuming that average productivity growth before the shock hit equalled its steady
state rate of 3.42%, this implies a decline of average productivity growth from one
decade to the next of 0.96%. Interestingly, average German productivity growth did
decline by 1.44% from the 1970s to the 1980s.17
4.2 Understanding the Evolution of Unemployment in the
New Growth Economy
We know from (9) that an increase in unemployment will reduce real wage growth
which would tend to lower marginal costs, so there must be a strong countervailing
force pushing marginal costs up in order to explain why in￿ ation stops falling. Figure
6 shows that while real wage growth drops sharply, in quarter 2 the growth rate of
the capital stock falls by even more and remains considerably below real wage growth
for about 9 quarters. After that they are about equal. Slower capital stock growth
entails slower technological progress and thus slower growth of labour productivity,
which will tend to generate a higher trajectory of marginal cost for a given level of
real wage growth. In the New Growth model, the movement of real wages relative to
labour productivity for a given employment level is thus captured by the evolution
of the wage capital ratio. This variable matters a lot for marginal cost, as shown
by (14). Figure 7, which plots the deviations of marginal cost and the wage capital
ratio from their steady state values con￿rms that it is the movement of the real wage
capital ratio which drives marginal cost back up, as both move broadly in parallel.
17Productivity is measured as real GDP per hour worked. The data was taken from Statistisches
Bundesamt Wiesbaden (2007b). A sophisticated analysis of changes in trend productivity growth
by Skoczylas and Tissot (2005) ￿nds a negative break for Germany in 1979 of -2.75%
15Figure 6: New Growth Economy, Baseline















Figure 7: New Growth Economy, Baseline
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16By contrast, in the JLN economy, the e⁄ect of the capital stock on marginal
costs is much weaker. The major determinant of marginal costs apart from real
wages is total factor productivity TFPt. This grows exogenously no matter whether
output and investment are contracting or growing. Thus marginal costs or, to put it
di⁄erently, the permissible, non-in￿ ationary rate of real wage growth are much less
a⁄ected by changes to the capital stock.
Turning back to the New Growth economy, the recovery of actual employment
has to slow down after about 6 quarters because unemployment arrives at a level
beyond which any reduction would cause in￿ ation to accelerate as it pushes real wage
growth above the growth rate of the capital stock and thus pushes up marginal cost.
This would trigger interest rate increases via the policy rule. In fact this is already
happening as actual unemployment is falling below the NAIRU and in￿ ation starts
to pick up. To put it di⁄erently, the central bank does not have a reason to boost
employment by aggressively lowering the interest rate because although in￿ ation is
somewhat below target, the output gap is closed as marginal cost equals its steady
state value. Figure 8 shows that the central bank stops lowering the real interest rate
it ￿ Et￿t after 8 quarters, when it is 0.45 percentage points (about 1.81 percentage
points at an annualised rate) below the steady state value, and begins to tighten
again.
This level of the real interest rate, while below its steady state value, is not very
expansionary. Figure 9 summarises the bene￿ts from investing by plotting the present
discounted value of an additional unit of capital, qt. qt recovers quickly after the shock
has passed and reaches its steady state value of one after ￿ve quarters. It then slightly
exceeds it￿ s steady state level for six quarters. However, this is not su¢ ciently high to
move the capital stock growth rate up quickly because of the investment adjustment
costs: The ￿rst order condition (6) determines the investment growth rate, which due
to fast recovery of qt; moves much closer to it￿ s steady state value as well. However,
the capital stock growth rate depends on the investment capital ratio, as can be seen
from equation (3), which has declined during the recession and subsequent period
of slow growth. Thus a faster recovery of capital stock growth would require an
investment growth rate exceeding the steady state, which would have to be induced
by an above steady state qt which in turn would require a lower real interest rate.
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18The speed of recovery is then governed by the relative growth rates of real wages
and the capital stock. From quarter 9 onwards, the capital stock grows slightly faster
than real wages. This causes a slow decline in the wage-capital ratio (￿gure 8), and
a slow reduction in unemployment as higher productivity growth implies ￿rms can
accommodate the increased real wage growth associated with a tighter labour market
without facing an increase in marginal costs. This, in turn, again increases capital
stock growth by increasing the marginal product of capital.
4.3 The In￿ ation-Unemployment Trade-O⁄
These results provoke the question how changes to the central bank￿ s reaction function
would a⁄ect the long-run paths of employment and in￿ ation. Intuition suggests that
a stronger weight on the output gap in the reaction function would lead to a smaller
decrease in employment not just in the short but also in the long run. As investment
would be squeezed less, there would be a smaller decline in capital stock growth which
could accommodate higher non-in￿ ationary employment after the recovery from the
recession. To show this we increase the coe¢ cient on the output gap,  y, to 5, leaving
all other parameters the same. The corresponding evolution of unemployment can
be obtained from ￿gure 10. Indeed unemployment not only increases considerably
less in the short run (in fact it decreases on impact), and after 40 quarters, it is still
about 0.8 percentage point lower than in the Baseline case, as can be obtained from
the second line of table 4. Hence a less hawkish monetary policy has indeed very
long-lasting benign e⁄ects on unemployment.
19The lower increase in unemployment comes at the cost of a considerably stronger
short run in￿ ation surge. While in the baseline simulation, in￿ ation peaks at a (quar-
terly) rate of 3.3%, it now increases as high as 4.9% in the ￿rst quarter (￿gure 11),
20while the annual in￿ ation rate over the ￿rst year amounts to 15%. Note however that
the increase in in￿ ation is only temporary. After 10 quarters, it has already decreased
to 0.42%. Thus the stronger acceleration in in￿ ation is a short run phenomenon. The
gain in employment is of more persistent nature.
As mentioned above, Ball (1999) ￿nds that during the recessions of the early 1980s,
countries whose central banks aggressively lowered interest rates experienced smaller
increases in the NAIRU than those which did not. Ball calculates the di⁄erence
between the NAIRU in the year before the recession and ￿ve years after. He de￿nes a
recession as one year with GDP growth below 1%. He regresses this on the maximum
reduction of the ex-post real interest rate during any time of the recessions ￿rst year,
which he refers to as maximum easing.18 The coe¢ cient on maximum easing is -0.42
and is signi￿cant at the 10% level.19 We try to replicate this relationship with our
New Growth model by varying the output gap coe¢ cient between 0 and 4, leaving
everything else the same, thus obtaining data on maximum easing and the ￿ve year
change in the NAIRU. Our resulting coe¢ cient on maximum easing is negative as
well and varies between -0.24 and -1.16. This is for the most part consistent with
Ball￿ s estimate.
5 Cross Country Aspects
The previous section shows that our New Keynesian model with endogenous growth
is able to produce a persistent increase in unemployment as a consequence of a dis-
in￿ ation. This is an important result because economists have been struggling to
explain the evolution of unemployment in continental Europe over time. This begs
the question whether we can also use the model to replicate di⁄erences in unemploy-
ment evolutions across countries. We address this issue in three di⁄erent ways in this
section. For that purpose, we will draw on the di⁄erences in the size of the disin￿ ation
across the OECD, in (estimates of) the policy reaction function coe¢ cients between
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve and in real wage rigidity.
We noted earlier that there is a negative correlation between the change in in￿ a-
tion and the change in the NAIRU. Ball (1996) investigated this for the 1980s and
we plotted it over two decades and across 21 OECD countries in ￿gure 2. There
are various possible reasons why countries might have di⁄erently sized disin￿ ations.
Economies might di⁄er in the way they respond to global supply shocks, perhaps
due to di⁄erences in energy intensity of production. Their past record of monetary
policy might di⁄er as well, (in the sense that some central banks have let in￿ ation
spiral more out of bounds than others, leading to larger deviations of in￿ ation from
target), as might choices of how much to disin￿ ate (a central bank might just be
willing to accept a higher in￿ ation rate following a supply shock). Finally, exchange
18Ball controls for the duration of unemployment bene￿ts.
19See Ball (1999), p. 207.
21rate volatility might di⁄er as well. Incorporating these various sources of in￿ ation
volatility into our model would be far beyond the scope of this paper. However, we
do try to mimic their in￿ ationary impact by varying the size of the cost push shock.
We vary the size of the cost push shock from 0.01 to 0.05, leaving all other parame-
ters unchanged. Then we calculate the change from year 1 to year 10 of the in￿ ation
rate during those years and the NAIRU in the ￿rst quarter of those years, and plot
the later against the former in ￿gure 12.20 There is a clear negative correlation. The
slope of the line varies between -0.41 and -0.56, which is not too far away from the
simple regression coe¢ cient of -0.33 (or -0.36 if, like Ball (1996) we exclude Greece)
resulting from a regression of the change in the NAIRU on the change in in￿ ation
using the OECD data presented earlier.
































Let us now take a look at the e⁄ect of observable di⁄erences in the monetary
policy rule. To get a proper idea of the e⁄ects of these it is obviously important
20We take the di⁄erence of the ￿rst quarter of both years since the NAIRU moves up very fast
during the ￿rst four quarters. Di⁄erencing the annual averages of the two years would create a
misleading impression of the correlation between the medium run change in the NAIRU (by unduly
reducing this change) and the change in in￿ ation. The quarterly movements of the NAIRU in the
OECD data are very slow and redoing ￿gure one with the di⁄erence in the NAIRU between 1980
quarter1 1990 quarter 1 rather than with the di⁄erences in the annual averages as is the case now
would not change the result.
22to have comparable estimates. Therefore we make use of the fact that Clarida et
al. (1998) estimated the same policy rule using the same methodology for several
countries, including Germany and the United States. We would have liked to draw
on real time estimates as in the previous section but to our knowledge, internationally
comparable estimates of this kind do not exist. The coe¢ cient estimates of Clarida
et al. of (15) for the Federal Reserve are reproduced in table 3.
We now repeat the same experiment we conducted in the last section for both the
estimates for the Bundesbank reaction function and the coe¢ cients of the Federal
Reserve. The ￿rst two lines of Table 5 show the deviation of unemployment from
steady state for both set of coe¢ cients. Note ￿rst that the persistent increase in
unemployment with the policy rule as speci￿ed and estimated by Clarida et al. for
the Bundesbank is substantially higher than the increase we saw with the policy rule
used in the Baseline. This illustrates that, in terms of the unemployment e⁄ects
which are the subject of this paper, we were quite conservative in specifying and
calibrating our Baseline policy rule. Apart from that, unemployment is persistently
higher under the Bundesbank rule than under the Federal Reserve one, though the
di⁄erence is for the most part less than one percentage point. For instance after 10
years, unemployment and the NAIRU are about 0.5 percentage points higher under
the Bundesbank Rule than under the Federal Reserve rule.
It is, however, informative to take a look at the standard errors associated with
Clarida et al.￿ s estimate. For instance, the standard error associated with the co-
e¢ cient on the lagged interest rate ￿ has as standard error of 0.03. Thus a value
for ￿ of 0.06 is still consistent (at a 5% level of con￿dence) with Clarida et al.￿ s es-
timate. The third row of table 9 shows the implied evolution of unemployment if
we set ￿ = 0:91. The resulting unemployment trajectory is substantially lower than
before. After 40 quarters, the unemployment and the NAIRU are now 1.1 percentage
points lower than under the Bundesbank rule, while after 50 quarters, the di⁄erence
is still 1 percentage point. In the same manner, we can also make use of the stan-
dard error of the estimate of  Y, which equals 0.16. Increasing  Y to 0.88 yields
the employment trajectory shown in the ￿nal row of table 5, which is again lower
than with the point estimate. After 40 quarters, unemployment is and the NAIRU
are about 0.9 percentage points lower than under the Bundesbank policy rule. Thus
in the New Growth model, di⁄erences in policy function parameters consistent with
Clarida et al.￿ s estimate can contribute to explaining the di⁄erent evolutions of the
unemployment rate in Germany as compared to the United States.
Accordingly, di⁄erences in monetary policy also explain di⁄erences in the change
in the productivity growth rate between Germany and United States from the 1970s
to the 1980s. As noted above, average US productivity growth declined by only about
0.18% from the 1970s to the 1980s, whereas the decline in Germany was about 1.4%.
Table 6 displays the di⁄erence between average annualised productivity growth during
the ￿rst decade after the shock and the decade before the shock.21 Thus within the
21As above we assume that during the decade before the shock hits, the average productivity
23New Growth model, di⁄erences in monetary policy would account for between 0.24
and 0.6 percentage points of the di⁄erence in productivity growth.
Table 5: Results for Clarida et al.￿ s Policy Rules
Unemployment Deviation from the Steady State, percentage Points
Quarter 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Bundesbank 3.8 3.8 3.1 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1
Federal Reserve 2.9 3.1 2.5 2 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.9
Federal Reserve, ￿ = 0:91 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 2.4 2.5 2 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7
Table 6: Results for Clarida et al.￿ s Policy Rules
Change in ten Year Average
productivity Growth, percentage Points
Bundesbank -1.28%
Federal Reserve -1.04%
Federal Reserve, ￿ = 0:91 -0.68%
Federal Reserve,  Y = 0:88 -0.88%
Finally, we explore the e⁄ects of the observed cross continental di⁄erences in the
nature of real wage rigidity. As was mentioned above, empirical estimates of wage
setting functions repeatedly ￿nd that real wage growth is negatively related to the
labour share in Europe but not in the United States. Therefore, in our ￿nal exper-
iment aimed at highlighting cross country dimensions, we set c = 0 in the Baseline
calibration, leaving everything else as in the Baseline. The resulting deviation of un-
employment from its steady state can be obtained from table 7. Clearly, the increase
in unemployment is persistently lower. After 40 quarters, unemployment is only 0.6
percentage points higher than in the steady state, compared to 1.7 percentage points
in the Baseline. Average annualised productivity growth is only 0.36% lower than in
the previous decade as opposed to 0.96% in the baseline calibration.
Within our model, c=0 would arise if there is no direct e⁄ect of productivity
on e⁄ort and if bene￿ts are not linked to productivity. We suggested above that
these results might be rooted in stronger unions and perhaps a stronger link between
unemployment bene￿ts and productivity in Europe. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
￿nd that the impact of macroeconomic shocks on unemployment is a⁄ected by the
labour market structure. They ￿nd that both unobservable macroeconomic shocks
(captured by a time e⁄ect) as well as a one percentage point reduction in total factor
productivity growth increase unemployment by more the higher is union density.22
This result is con￿rmed by Fitoussi et al. (2000).23 In that sense, our model provides
some theoretical to the notion that both "shocks and institutions" (Blanchard and
growth rate equalled its steady state.
22See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), pp. C20-C28.
23See Fitoussi et al. (2000), p. 250.
24Wolfers) are crucial to explaining the cross country evidence on the evolution of
unemployment.
Table 7: c = 0 - Percentage point Deviation of Unemployment from its
Steady State for selected Quarters
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
6 Conclusion
This paper employes a New Keynesian model with unemployment and endogenous
growth to explain the persistent increase in continental European unemployment and
the lack thereof in the United States. We calibrate key parameters like the coe¢ cients
in the wage setting equation and the interest feedback rule of the central bank to
Western German data. The model economy is hit with a one quarter cost-push shock
calibrated to induce a disin￿ ation of an order of magnitude seen at the beginning of
the 1980s in many industrialised OECD economies. We perform the same experiment
on a model without endogenous growth: The JLN economy.
Under the baseline calibration, unemployment will still be about 1.8 percentage
points above its pre-shock value after about 10 years. As can be observed with con-
tinental European unemployment rates, unemployment increases quickly but reverts
only very slowly. At the same time, in￿ ation stops declining soon after the cost push
shock has vanished, implying that the NAIRU has increased. Unsurprisingly, no such
e⁄ect is seen in the JLN economy, where unemployment is back to its steady state
after about two years.
The increase in the NAIRU in the New Growth economy is brought about by the
decline in investment during the recession required to disin￿ ate the economy. In the
New Growth economy, for a given employment level, capital stock growth determines
labour productivity growth. Hence the real wage-capital ratio is the main driver
of marginal costs. Thus, although wage growth declines as employment contracts,
marginal cost returns back to its steady state level soon after the shock has vanished
because capital stock growth for while declines even more. This stops the disin￿ ation.
The subsequent recovery is very slow because the central bank has no reason to lower
interest rates. Its reaction function dictates that it reacts solely to in￿ ation, being
close to target, and the output gap, de￿ned as the deviation of output from the level
consistent with constant in￿ ation, which is zero.
The model thus also contributes, to explaining the productivity slowdown ob-
served across advanced OECD economies, and why negative shocks to productivity
growth are frequently signi￿cant variables in regression of unemployment on this
variable and others.
Finally, apart from generating a persistent increase in unemployment, the model
also contributes to explaining cross country di⁄erences in unemployment. Varying the
25size of the cost push shock generates a relationship between the change in the in￿ ation
rate and the change in the NAIRU over a ten year horizon similar to a relationship
in the data ￿rst observed by Ball (1996). Using comparable policy rule estimates
of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserves
while holding the cost-push shock constant creates higher persistent unemployment
with the later than with the former. Finally, taking account of a well established
cross-continental di⁄erence in the structure of the wage setting function, namely the
absence of a labour share term, also proves informative. In the absence of the labour
share term, we see a lower increase in the NAIRU. The size of the labour share term
in wage setting can be linked, if coarsely so, to features of the labour market like
union density or the bene￿t system. Thus the paper lends support to the view that,
as suggested by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), it is both "shocks and institutions"
which are at the heart of explaining the evolution of unemployment across time and
the di⁄erences across countries.
7 Appendix A: Derivation of the JLN and the En-
dogenous Growth Model
7.1 Households
Danthine and Kurmann (2004) introduce unemployment in a general equilibrium
model without moving away from the representative agent framework. In the Danthine-
Kurmann setup individuals are organized in in￿nitely lived households. All decisions
regarding the intertemporal allocation of consumption and the accumulation of cap-
ital are made at the household level. Each household member supplies one unit of
labour in-elastically but derives disutility from the e⁄ort G(et) he or she supplies
in their job. The share of unemployed members is the same for each family. The
large family assumption means that although there are unemployed individuals in
the economy, it is not necessary to track the distribution of wealth.
In addition, some workers supply overhead labour. They can be thought of as the
owners of the monopolistically competitive ￿rms. Overhead workers never become
unemployed because no ￿rm can produce without managerial sta⁄. A share ns of the
workforce is employed by the government who is assumed to pay the same wage as
the private sector. They are funded by lump sum taxes. All families have the same
share of managers and government employees.
Families solve the following constrained maximisation problem by choosing con-
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where Pt denotes the price index of the consumption basket. A family￿ s period
t income consists wages wt, interest income it￿1 on risk less bonds they bought in
the previous period Bt￿1, the pro￿ts of the monopolistically competitive ￿rms in the
economy zt, and dividends rk
t from renting out their accumulated capital Kt. They
have to pay lump sum taxes Tt: We assume adjustment costs in investment: Only
a fraction of one unit of investment expenditure is actually turned into additional
capital. This fraction decreases in the investment growth rate. The assumptions on
the ￿rst derivative of the S (:) function imply that adjustment costs vanish when the
economy is growing at its steady state growth rate g.24 This implies that the steady
state growth rate does not depend on the parameters of the adjustment cost function
S: Setting up the lagrangian and denoting the lagrange multipliers of the budget
constraint and the capital accumulation constraint as ￿t and ￿tqt yields the following
￿rst order conditions with respect to consumption, capital and investment:
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Note that with this notation, qt denotes the present discounted value of the future
pro￿ts associated with buying an additional unit of capital today, also known as
Tobin￿ s q. We assume logarithmic instantaneous utility. Following Schmitt-Grohe
24There are two advantages of assuming investment adjustment costs and external habit formation.
Firstly, it facilitates matching the second moments of investment and consumption, and secondly,
it makes the on impact response of unemployment to the cost push shock in the simulation we are
going to perform later more reasonable. By contrast, the impact on the longer run response of
unemployment is rather small.
27and Uribe (2005), we assume S
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: Applying
these functional forms yields the expressions discussed in section 2 of the paper.






￿0 + ￿1 logwt(j) + ￿2(nt ￿ n)
+￿3 logwt + ￿4 logwt￿1 ￿ ￿5 logbt ￿ ￿8 log(Yt￿1=(nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ ns))
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; (25)
logbt = ￿6 log(Yt￿1=(nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ n
s)) + (1 ￿ ￿6)logwt￿1 + ￿7 (26)
￿1;￿5 > 0;1 = ￿6 = 0;￿2;￿3;￿4 < 0;￿1 > ￿￿3
where Yt is private sector output. Note that the e⁄ort function enters the fami-
lies￿utility separately which implies that it is independent of the budget constraint.
Furthermore, state employees are assumed not to perform any e⁄ort while at work.
The ￿rst order condition with respect to e⁄ort is
et(j) = ￿0 + ￿1 logwt(j) + ￿2 (nt ￿ n) + ￿3 logwt (27)
+￿4 logwt￿1 ￿ ￿5 logbt ￿ ￿8 (Yt￿1=(nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ n
s))
The structure of the cost of e⁄ort function is motivated by the idea of "gift ex-
change" between the ￿rm and the worker. The worker￿ s gift to the employer is e⁄ort.
The employer has to show his appreciation for the employees￿contribution by paying
an appropriate wage wt(j). A higher contemporary average wage wt reduces e⁄ort
because it represents a "reference level" to which the current employers￿wage o⁄er
is compared. Put di⁄erently, it requires the ￿rm to pay a higher wage if it wants
to extract the same amount of e⁄ort. A higher average past real wage wt￿1 boosts
the workers￿aspirations as well.25 The aggregate employment level of non-overhead
workers nt ￿ n summarizes labour market tightness. It is thus positively related to
the workers￿outside working opportunities, and thus also tends to reduce e⁄ort.
The view that wages have a big e⁄ect on workers morale and thus productivity
because they signal to the worker how his contribution to the organizational goals
is valued is supported by an extensive microeconomic survey conducted by Bew-
ley (1989). Bewley found that wage changes (in particular wage cuts) seem to be
especially important. Bewley interviewed over 300 business people, labour leaders
and business consultants in search for an explanation why wages are rarely cut in
recessions.26
25See Danthine and Kurmann (2004), pp. 111-113. It would be desirable to have the individual
workers past real wage wt (j) in the equation but that would considerably complicate the max-
imisation problem of the representative ￿rm dealt with later, so we follow Danthine and Kurman
in assuming a dependence of e⁄ort on the average wage. For the same reason we include average
productivity rather than the respective ￿rm￿ s productivity.
26See Bewley (1998), pp. 459-490. A discussion of further evidence is Bewley (2004). Bewley
also argues that his ￿ndings contradicts essentially all theoretical justi￿cations of real wage rigidity
not based on gift exchange considerations, like implicit contracts, insider outsider models or the
e¢ ciency wage models based on no-shirking conditions.
28The terms bt and (Yt￿1=(nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ ns)) represent and a modi￿cation to the Dan-
thine and Kurman (2004) cost of e⁄ort function. bt denotes unemployment income.
This will be chie￿ y unemployment bene￿ts and black market income. It tends to
lower the level of e⁄ort.27 Workers want to be valued more than someone who re-
ceives bene￿ts or does not have a legal job. bt is linked both to past real wages and
past productivity in the private sector, where Yt denotes private sector output. This
may re￿ ect both the structure of bene￿ts and the manner in which the black market is
linked to the o¢ cial economy. Productivity also has a direct e⁄ect on morale and ef-
fort as employees desire their due share of the companies￿success. Unions might play
a role in this to the extent that they instil a sense of entitlement among employees.
The employer takes this relationship into account when setting the wage, as will
be discussed further below.
7.2 Cost Minimisation and E¢ ciency Wages




where the output of ￿rm i Yt(i) depends on the capital stock of ￿rm i Kt(i), the
e¢ ciency of its workers et(i) and the number of non-overhead workers nt(i) ￿ n: In
the Danthine and Kurman model (2004), in a ￿rst stage the ￿rm minimises its cost of
producing a given amount of output. Capital and labour are hired in economy wide
factor market. However, the ￿rm does not take the real wage as given but sets it
taking into account the relationship between e⁄ort and wages given by (27).28 Hence








and et(i) = ￿0 + ￿1 logwt(i) + ￿2 (nt ￿ n) + ￿3 logwt
+￿4 logwt￿1 ￿ ￿5 logbt ￿ ￿8 (Yt￿1=(nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ n
s))
The ￿rst order conditions for capital and labour are
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k








27Danthine and Kurman (2007) introduce the bene￿t level as a factor which, ceteris paribus,
reduces e⁄ort.
28See Danthine and Kurman (2004), pp. 114-115.
29where mct(i) and rk
t refer to real marginal costs of ￿rm i and the capital rental
rate. It will be shown below that even though all ￿rms set the wage individually,
￿rms will ￿nd it optimal to set the same wage and the same e¢ ciency level. Dividing






t : Thus the capital labour ratio is
the same across ￿rms. It is then easily shown using the production function that the







wt = (1 ￿ ￿)mct
Yt
nt ￿ ns ￿ n
(31)
This then means that the capital to (productive) labour ratio, the output per unit of
productive labour ratio and marginal costs are the same in all ￿rms, as can be easily







t : Substituting this back into equation (30) yields an
equation for mct(i) containing only labour augmenting technological progress and the








A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(￿1TFPt)1￿￿ (32)
We now turn to wage setting. The ￿rst order conditions with respect to e⁄ort and
the real wage are




￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)mct
Yt(i)
et(i)
Combining those with the ￿rst order condition with respect to labour yields an
optimal e⁄ort level of ￿1. Substituting this back into the e⁄ort function (27), we note
that, as the ￿rm￿ s wage depends only on aggregate variables which are the same for
all ￿rms, it must indeed hold that wt(i) = wt . Substituting for logbt and rearranging
then yields






nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ ns
￿￿
Subtracting (￿5￿6 + (1 ￿ ￿5))logwt￿1 on both sides and dividing by (￿1 + ￿3) then
yields
30logwt =





(nt ￿ n) +








wt￿1 (nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ ns)
Yt￿1
￿
Hence with the coe¢ cient restrictions imposed above, the wage depends positively
on the past real wage and non managerial employment. It will be above its market
clearing level and thus there is unemployment in the economy.
Note that the last term in brackets is in fact the private sector labour share.
If this were constant in the steady state, as it would be at a constant employment
level, equation (34) could be solved for a long run real wage if
￿5+￿8￿￿4
￿1+￿3 < 1: As
mentioned above however, in our model, Danthine and Kurmann￿ s, is a growth model.
Therefore the real wage must be growing in the steady state. Thus a wage setting
function simply relating the wage level to employment would not be consistent with
a stable employment level. The easiest way to deal with the issue therefore is to set
￿5+￿8￿￿4
￿1+￿3 = 1. This does not seem too restrictive: It simply says that an increase in
the log of the time t real wage in the economy (including ￿rm i) has in absolute value
the same net e⁄ect on e⁄ort (remember we have ￿1 + ￿3 > 0) as an increase in the
exogenous reference as represented by logwt￿1, logbt and log(Yt￿1=(nt￿1 ￿ n ￿ ns)):
Thus we arrive at a real wage Phillips Curve with a labour share term:
logwt ￿ logwt￿1 = a + b ￿ (nt ￿ n) + clog
￿





￿0 ￿ ￿1 + ￿5￿7
￿1 + ￿3
, b = ￿
￿2
￿1 + ￿3




Equation (35) is a real wage Phillips Curve plus an "error correction term" rep-
resented by the log of the labour share. Note that if there is no e⁄ect of productivity
on e⁄ort and (￿8 = 0) and no e⁄ect of productivity on bene￿ts (￿6 = 0) we have
c = 0:
It remains to determine the size of the overhead labour force. Following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999), we assume that in the steady state, all economic pro￿t gener-
ated by employing productive labour and capital goes to the overhead sta⁄. Hence
the ￿rm ends up with zero pro￿ts.29 This is justi￿ed because setting up production
is impossible without overhead labour and the ￿rms pro￿t is thus essentially equal to
the collective marginal product of its overhead sta⁄. We assume that the overhead
sta⁄splits this pro￿t equally. We assume the amount of overhead workers required to
enable production is such that the real wage for overhead and non-overhead workers
29See Rotemberg and Woodford (2004), pp. 15-16.
31will be exactly the same in the steady state. These assumptions allow for a straight-
forward way to determine the amount of overhead and non-overhead workers as a
function of total employment. Zero pro￿t requires
￿ ￿ 1
￿
Yt ￿ wtn = 0
where
￿￿1









n ￿ ns ￿ n
￿ s







7.3 Price Setting and Nominal Rigidities
Each ￿rm produces one of the variants of the output good in the CES basket. House-
holds spread their expenditures across the di⁄erent varieties in the basket in a cost
minimising fashion. Assuming that investment expenditure stretches over these vari-
ants in precisely the same way as consumption demand, we can write the demand





. Following Rotemberg (1983) we assume
that the representative ￿rm faces quadratic costs if it alters its individual price in-
￿ ation from a reference level ￿ ￿ 1. This is the steady state level of in￿ ation in the
economy. These cost arise because frequent price changes are bad for the reputation
of the company. Convincing customers to remain with the company nevertheless is
costly. Additional costs arise because deviating from the "standard" level of in￿ ation
requires the ￿rm to engage in a costly re-optimisation process. This has to be carried
out by high paid marketing professionals, while price changes close to average in￿ a-
tion can be decided by lower paid "frontline" sta⁄. Both kinds of costs are likely to


















yt+i(j) ￿ mct+iyt+i(j) ￿ ACt+i(j)
￿￿
(37)
where ￿t;t+i denotes the discount factor used to discount real pro￿ts earned in period
t+i back to period t. Note that because households own the ￿rms, we have ￿t;t+i =
32￿
i u0(Ct+i)
u0(Ct) : Di⁄erentiating with respect to pt(j) and noting that, as all ￿rms are the
same, pt(j) = Pt holds ex post, yields






























which is a nonlinear version of the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. It is, how-
ever, a consistent feature of empirical estimations of Phillips curves that speci￿cations
which include lagged in￿ ation as well ("hybrid" Phillips curves") perform better than
purely forward looking Phillips Curves. This is because in￿ ation has inertia.30 Back-
ward looking elements are easily introduced into the price setting considerations of
the ￿rm by assuming that the reference level of in￿ ation does not remain constant
over time. Instead, we assume that it equals last periods in￿ ation, i.e. ￿t =
Pt￿1
Pt￿2:
If the in￿ ation rate becomes higher for several periods, ￿rms will mandate frontline
sta⁄ to handle price increases of that size in order to keep costs low. Customers will
get used to the di⁄erent pace of price changes as well, making a higher rate of price
change less costly for the individual ￿rm. Hence we have





































The experiment we want to conduct later is a disin￿ ation. In￿ ation is brought into
the economy by a so called "cost-push shock" ut widely used in the New Keynesian
literature.31 This shock increases current in￿ ation, holding the values of past in￿ ation
and marginal costs constant, and is added directly to the Phillip￿ s curve equation:













































It is easily shown that up to ￿rst order, this Phillips Curve resembles very closely
speci￿cations which are obtained by Woodford (2003) under the assumption of Calvo
contracts and full indexation of the prices of those ￿rms which can not re-optimise
prices to past in￿ ation.32 It is a forward looking accelerationist Phillips Curve. If
present and future marginal costs are at their steady state level and present and future
values of cost push shock are zero, in￿ ation will remain constant. It will accelerate
or decelerate otherwise. Hence the model has a well de￿ned NAIRU.
30See for instance Gali and Gertler (2000).
31See for instance Clarida et al (1999), pages 1665 and 1667.
32See Woodford (2003), p. 215. In fact, the coe¢ cients on expected future in￿ ation and the
coe¢ cient on lagged in￿ ation exactly match Woodfords￿results.
337.4 De￿nition of the Output Gap
The output gap is the percentage deviation of total output, i.e. private sector plus
the output of government employees, from its natural level. We calculate the output
of government employees by simply adding up their wages, following the convention
of national accounts. We assume that government employees earn the same wage as
in the private sector. For total output, we then have Yt + wtns, while total natural
output is given by Y n
t +wn
t ns. wn
t and Y n
t denote the wage rate and the private sector
output level consistent with natural employment, or the NAIRU. Thus we have
gpt =







t denotes the private sector output level which would set marginal costs equal to
its long run level ￿￿1; given the capital stock and the previous period￿ s real wage. As
can be obtained from equation (40), this would ensure that in the absence of cost push
shocks, in￿ ation is neither rising nor falling. The employment level corresponding to
this output level will be referred to as "natural employment" nn
t . The natural levels
of output and employment are derived by substituting the equation for the rental on
capital (30) and the wage setting equation (35) into (32) and setting mct = ￿￿1: The















t ￿ logwt￿1 = a + b ￿ (n
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t ￿ n) + clog
￿











Note that given the past real wage, the capital stock has a positive e⁄ect on
natural employment given the past real wage. This e⁄ect works through the negative
e⁄ect of a higher capital stock on the capital rental. This tends to lower marginal
costs and thus accommodates a higher real wage given the mark-up. This allows the
employer to meet the demands of wage setters associated with higher employment.
7.5 Introducing Endogenous Growth
The basic idea in the knowledge spill-over model of Romer (1986) is to start o⁄with a
standard neoclassical production function with labour augmenting technical progress
as above.33 An additional feature is that labour augmenting technological progress
might be ￿rm speci￿c. Thus the output of ￿rm i is given by
Yt(i) = F(Kt(i);TFPt (i)nt(i)) (43)
33The exposition here follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.212-222.
34Romer then makes two crucial assumptions:
￿ Increasing it￿ s physical capital simultaneously teaches the ￿rm how to produce
more e¢ ciently. This idea was ￿rst suggested by Arrow (1962). For simplicity,
in the Romer setup, TFPt (i) is simply proportional to the ￿rm￿ s capital stock.
￿ Knowledge is a public good. Hence each ￿rm￿ s knowledge is in fact proportional
to the aggregate capital stock rather than to its own.34 However, the impact of
the ￿rm￿ s capital stock on the aggregate capital stock is so small that they can
be neglected. Thus the production function of ￿rm i becomes
Yt(i) = F(Kt(i);Ktnt(i)) (44)
This implies that there are now constant returns to capital at the economy wide
level, allowing per capita output to grow. However, there are still decreasing returns
to capital at the ￿rm level. In the Romer model, this leads to a growth rate which is
ine¢ ciently low. This is because saving is to low as the individual return on capital
falls short of the social return on capital.
Thus we set TFPt = Kt in the equations derived in the previous section. The








A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(￿1Kt)1￿￿ (45)
Yt = AKt(￿1 (nt ￿ n
s ￿ n))
1￿￿ (46)
To arrive at from the production function (5); after setting TFPt = Kt, we divide by
nt(i) ￿ n: As the capital labour ratio and the output per unit of productive labour
ratio are the same across all ￿rms, we arrive at (46):
The capital stock now has a stronger e⁄ect on both marginal costs and output than
in the JLN economy. An increase in the capital stock by 1% for a given employment
level (implying that output expands at the same rate) reduces marginal costs by
1%: In the absence of endogenous growth the e⁄ect is only ￿% This can be see by
substituting the capital rental out of equations (32) and (45) and then substituting
Yt
Kt using the respective production functions.
Accordingly, the capital stock also has a greater e⁄ect on natural employment and










t ￿ logwt￿1 = a + b ￿ (n
n
t ￿ n) + clog
￿










34See Barro/ Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp.21-22.
35Clearly, an increase in the capital stock now accommodates a larger increase in
natural employment than in (42):
8 Appendix B : Normalised Version of the New
Growth Model
As we are dealing with two growth models, we have to stationarise all variables which
would otherwise be trended in order to be able to solve the model. This appendix
applies this normalisation to the New Growth model. The resulting equations are








as Dt;Habt￿1; Ft; Rt and Ht; while the gross capital stock growth rate
Kt+1
Kt ￿ 1 is
de￿ned as gk
t+1:
We directly apply the normalisation to the equations of the aggregate demand
block:




2 (Ft ￿ Htn
s) + Htn
s (48)


































































































From (3) we have
g
k













￿ (1 + g)
￿2!
(53)
36The rental on capital becomes:
r
k
t = ￿mct (Ft ￿ Htn
s) (54)
















where X = A
1
1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿1.


















+ clog((1 ￿ ￿)mct￿1)




￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)mct￿1)
c (56)
Employment: from Outputt = AKt((nt ￿ n ￿ ns)￿1)1￿￿ + wtns; we have




The Phillips Curve and the Policy rule do not contain any trended variables and
therefore does not need to be normalised. However, we will substitute the real pro￿ts
























































Pt￿1+i = 1 + ￿t+i gives
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿mct ￿ ’((￿t ￿ ut) ￿ ￿t￿1)(1 + ￿t ￿ ut) + ￿
’
2









(￿t+1 ￿ (￿t ￿ ut))(1 + ￿t+1)
￿
= 0 (61)




























￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)mct￿1)
c (63)
given last periods wage/ capital ratio Ht￿1 and this periods capital stock growth
rate gk
t (which was also determined in the t-1 by the then investment decision). The
















9 Appendix C: Steady State Relations
This Appendix shows how to calculate the steady state values for the system devel-
oped in Appendix B. We will ￿rst derive a steady state relation between the level of
employment and the steady state growth rate for the New Growth Economy.
First apply the fact that in the steady state, gK
t = g to (52) which yields q = 1:





t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
= (1 + g) (65)
In the New Growth economy, we now replace the capital rental with equation (54)





(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿




This is the steady state growth rate which is borne out by the marginal product
of capital in the endogenous growth economy. It is easily veri￿ed that it is increasing
and concave in employment. It is straightforward to show that in the steady state,
the real wage implied by the desired mark-up grows at the same rate as output and
the capital stock by using mct = ￿￿1 and rk








Hence in the steady state, the real wage has to grow at the same rate as the capital
stock. This means that equation (67) actually the dynamic, endogenous growth
version of the familiar macroeconomic textbook price setting function: It gives the
real wage growth rate compatible with marginal costs remaining constant and at it￿ s
38long run level. Unlike the textbook price setting function, this real wage growth rate
is not constant but increases in employment: A higher steady state employment level
implies a higher marginal product of capital, which triggers higher investment and
thus faster capital stock- and thus productivity growth. Accordingly, the steady state
levels of employment an the growth rate are determined by the intersection of (66)
with the wage setting function (35), (making again use of the fact that mc = ￿￿1 in
the steady state).
In practice, we choose a desired steady state employment rate (here 0.96) and
then compute the wage setting function intercept a to support this value, given g, b
and ￿ and n:
Having determined g and n; the determination of the steady state values of
Ft;Dt;Rt;Ht;rk
t and it is now straightforward. For F we have
F = A((n ￿ n ￿ n
s)￿1)
1￿￿ (68)
from the production function. For Rt; we have from the capital accumulation equation
in (53)
R = g + ￿ (69)
D can then be determined as a residual via
D = F ￿ R (70)
H is computed using the cost-minimisation ￿rst order condition for labour (31)
H = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿1 F
n ￿ n ￿ ns (71)
rk is computed via
r
k = ￿￿
￿1A((n ￿ n ￿ n
s)￿1)
1￿￿ (72)





Note that this is also the intercept of the interest rate rule i of the central bank.
10 Appendix D: Normalised Version of the JLN
Economy
Most of the equations from Appendix B just carry over to the JLN economy. However,
there are a few changes related to the production function and the marginal cost equa-
tion. The aggregate production function is now Outputt = AK￿
t (TFPt￿1 (nt ￿ n ￿ ns))
1￿￿+
wtns: Dividing both sides by Kt gives




39where lt is de￿ned as TFPt






In the JLN model, it convenient to normalise the real wage with respect to TFPt
rather than with respect to Kt, while all the remaining normalisations carry over to
the JLN model. Denoting wt
TFPt as Hnc






A1=(1￿￿) (1 ￿ ￿)￿1
(76)





t ((nt ￿ n ￿ n
s)￿1)
1￿￿ (77)
The normalised wage setting equation becomes
H
nc






All the remaining equations are just the same as in the New Growth version. The
computation of the steady state values in the neoclassical model is slightly di⁄erent.
The steady state growth rate (of output, consumption, the capital stock, the real
wage) is now given by the parameter gTFP rather than being endogenously deter-
mined, which means we have g = gTFP: Hence we can compute the steady state real
interest rate from 73, while we compute rk from (65). From (78), we have the steady










which allows us to compute F from (74). Rearranging (76) then yields Hnc:
11 Appendix E: Estimation of the Wage Setting
Function
We estimate the real wage growth function using German data ranging from 1970Q1
to 2000Q4. Our dataset includes Western German data up to 1991Q4 and following
that data for the uni￿ed country. All data is taken from a publication of the German
"Statistisches Bundesamt", all of which has been seasonally adjusted.35 When esti-
mating the function, we replace the employment rate with one minus the unemploy-
ment rate. As a measure for labour costs, we use the "Arbeitnehmerentgeld" per hour
35See Statistisches Bundesamt (2006a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2007a).
40worked, which is employee compensation including the full tax wedge. This is de￿ ated
using the GDP price index. The labour share is given by total nominal compensation
(i.e. total "Arbeitnehmerentgeld") divided by total nominal GDP. Denoting the un-
employment rate as U, we then estimate ￿logwt = a+b￿Ut+clog(LSt￿1)+d92Q1;
where LSt￿1 denotes the previous periods labour share in GDP, d92Q1 denotes an
intercept dummy equalling one in 1992Q1 and zero everywhere else. The later is to
account for reuni￿cation. We use two stage least squares to account for the possi-
ble endogeneity of employment. As instruments, we choose ￿logrealwaget￿1;Ut￿1
(following Danthine and Kurman (2004));c and d92Q1:36
Note that we use Newey-West Standard Errors serial correlation consistent stan-
dard errors because the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation rejects the
hypotheses of no serial correlation at the 5% level. The result is reported in table E1,




Method: Two-Stage Least Squares
Date: 06/03/08 Time: 12:27
Sample (adjusted): 1970Q3 2000Q4
Included observations: 122 after adjustments
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=4)
Instrument list: WG(-1) C U(-1) LOG(LS(-2)) D92Q1
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.042273 0.018893 -2.237531 0.0271
U -0.120587 0.046582 -2.588689 0.0108
LOG(LS(-1)) -0.089599 0.032530 -2.754342 0.0068
D92Q1 -0.112300 0.002188 -51.33630 0.0000
R-squared 0.574362 Mean dependent var 0.005890
Adjusted R-squared 0.563541 S.D. dependent var 0.014077
S.E. of regression 0.009300 Sum squared resid 0.010205
F-statistic 52.46032 Durbin-Watson stat 2.535359
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note that our calibrated value of b is lower than the point estimate of 0.12. How-
ever, it is not statistically di⁄erent from 0.12 with any reasonable level of con￿dence,
in fact it is less than one standard deviation away from the point estimate. The rea-
son for this choice is that while it is possible to preserve the results of this paper in
face of higher wage ￿ exibility, this calibration has certain undesirable features. If we
aim to achieve a steady growth rate of GDP in the order of magnitude of a reasonable
order of magnitude (and one that makes lifetime utility converge), we would have to
choose either relatively high depreciation rates or a lower individual discount factor
36See Danthine and Kurman (2004), p. 121.
41￿, the later implying a very high steady state risk less rate. We think that these
considerations justify the choice of a value smaller than the point estimate.
The reason why the coe¢ cient of the labour share c also falls short of the calibrated
coe¢ cient, though the distance is again less than one standard deviation. This is due
to the fact that we have experimented with di⁄erent computations of the labour
share in GDP. The alternative computation was based on real values of GDP and
employee compensation. The later computations methods generated a value of -0.12
than the -0.1 we use in the simulations. It is not a priori clear which measure is more
appropriate. In fact to is common to interpret the labour share term as real wages
divided by productivity (i.e. real GDP/hour or real GDP/ employee) and enter these
variables separately.37 Furthermore, a reduction of c by 0.01 has only small e⁄ects on
our simulation results.
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